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THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN MAMLUK-JORDANIAN POWER RELATIONS
Bethany J. WALKER
Department of History, Grand Valley State University
Power politics between rulers and ruled need not always take the form of open conflict.
Particularly in rural society, the exercise of and response to state power can express themselves
in multiple, nuanced ways and through multiple channels, such as the administrative structure
and management of agricultural lands. Power relations based on access to and control of rural
land may alternate between cooption and coercion, on the part of the state, and cooperation,
and resistance, on the part of local villagers and tribesmen. Such are the patterns that emerge
from a combined analysis of written and archaeological data on Mamluk Jordan.
Today’s Jordan was, in the Mamluk period, divided into two different administrative
regions: Mamlakat Kerak (the Province of Kerak) in the south and the southern safaqa (district)
of Mamlakat Dimashq (the Province of Damascus) in the north. Together, the two regions
were of great strategic and economic importance to the Mamluk state. In the mid-thirteenth
century, Ayyubid princes still retained castles there, and the hajj route from Damascus to
Mecca ran through its interior. The peoples of the region brought sultans to power: Kerak
Castle, the “nursery” of and place of exile for Mamluk sultans, gave refuge to both al-Nasir
Muhammad and Barquq during their political exiles, and its local tribes actively supported
their return to the throne 1 . By the fifteenth century, Kerak had become a hotbed of political
discontent, where ambitious governors and amirs struggled for power within their own ranks
and against the sultan himself 2 . Such patterns of tribal support and amiral rebellion were not
1. Rukn al-Di¬ Baybars al-Dawadari, Zubdat al-fikra f¬ t®r¬kh al-hijra, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut, 1998), 316-317
and 416.
2. Shawkat R. Hujjah, al-Tar¬kh al-Siy®s¬ li-Minﬂaqa Sharq al-Urdunn (min Jan‚b al-Sh®m) fi ‘Asr Dawlat al-
Mam®lik al-Th®ni (Irbid, 2000), 115-119.
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limited to Kerak, but characterized much of Jordan in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
making the region critically important to the stability of the state. The Mamluks’ fluid
administration of the region, with shifting administrative borders and district capitals, was
one way that Cairo co-opted local tribes, manipulated their alliances, and attempted to quell
amiral rebellions 3 . Jordan, moreover, served the state in another strategic way by providing
Cairo with the horses on which its cavalry so heavily depended 4 .
In terms of its economic importance, Jordan’s rich farmland was exploited to its
maximum potential by the Mamluk state to support the iqﬂ®‘®t that were the financial and
social underpinnings of its military. In addition, the region produced for the Mamluks’ export
market, namely the sugar industry, which was one of the highest profit agricultural sectors of
the Mamluk economy. The foundation, however, of the Mamluks’ agricultural regime was
grains: Jordan was a key supplier of wheat to Cairo, in times of shortages there, and regionally.
Its geography and human and natural resources thus made Jordan important to the
Mamluk state on many levels. It is the power relations between the state and Jordanian peasants,
however, that is the focus of this paper. Key to these relations was control over land, through
tenure and planting decisions. Written and archaeological sources suggest that rather than
being passive participants in the Mamluks’ agricultural regime, the fall®Ω‚n did, at times,
assert control over their own natural resources and markets. This paper builds on the seminal
work of two Jordanian historians, who have written extensively on the Mamluk and early
Ottoman periods: Drs. Yusuf Ghawanmeh (Yarmouk University), who has written many books
and articles on Mamluk Jordan, and Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit, (the University of Jordan),
who has demonstrated the importance of the Ottoman period for Mamluk studies through his
analysis of sixteenth-century tax registers (defters). All of us doing research on Mamluk
Jordan are indebted to them for their many years of important and original scholarship.
GENERAL TRENDS IN LAND TENURE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY - STATE AGENDAS
The fourteenth century witnessed both the apex of rural development and prosperity
for Mamluk Jordan, as well as the beginning of administrative and economic processes that
3. Bethany J. Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bilad al-Sham in the Eighth/Fourteenth Century: The Case
of Hisban”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 62.4 (2003): 241-243.
4. Horses were collected from Transjordanian tribesmen as part of their taxes to the Ottoman state well into the
sixteenth century (Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit and Noufan Raja Hmoud, The Detailed Defter of Liwa’ ‘Ajlun (The
District of ‘Ajlun) Tapu Defter No. 970, Istanbul (Amman, 1989), 21).
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would transform, at least for a time, traditional Jordanian village society. While a single study
cannot properly examine the myriad factors behind this transformation nor fully assess its
long-term impact, I would like to briefly discuss two state-led initiatives that set into motion
this transformation: the cadastral survey of southern Syria (rawk) of al-N®◊ir Muhammad in
713/1313 and the endowment of rural land by state officials as waqf. The response to these
initiatives by Jordanian peasants will be addressed in turn.
IQﬁ§‘§T
The rawk of 713/1313 was the first of four surveys ordered by al-N®◊ir MuΩammad,
which collectively laid the economic foundations for Mamluk society by reallocating iqﬂ®‘s
among the sultan, amirs, and members of the Ωalqa. Most of the scholarly studies of these
surveys have focused on the Egyptian one of 715/1315 and its political and economic
ramifications 5 . It is more difficult to do the same for Syria. There are no records, either in
original or summary form, of any of the three Syrian surveys, and there are very few references
to them by Syrian historians. The surveys, thus, do not appear to attract the notice or interest
of contemporaries. Nonetheless, a few suggestions may be made about the possible structural
impact of the 713/1313 rawk on agricultural production, land tenure, and markets in Jordan.
The immediate results of the survey were to fragment land, assigning smaller, non-
contiguous and often widely dispersed, shares to the muqﬂ®’s, and to give more control over
land to the sultan himself. How this affected agricultural production and village life in general
would have depended on several factors: the types of crops traditionally grown there, the
nature of traditional crop rotation, how water was distributed, and how and when taxes were
paid and collected. Describing these factors first requires an understanding of how the iqﬂ®‘
system functioned economically and socially, that is what the relationships were between
muqﬂ®‘s and fall®Ω¬n. In the absence of written sources dealing directly with southern Syria
on such matters, we have to depend on Egyptian sources, taking into account that Egyptian
and Syrian societies were organized differently, that there were differences in access to and
sharing of water, and a different history of land proprietorship. Hassanein Rabie and Sato
Tsugitaka’s monographs on rural Egypt are suggestive in this regard. Relying largely on the
5. Tsugitaka Sato, State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqta‘s and Fallahun (Leiden, 1997), 138-
143; Petry 1998. A single article by Sato in the 1980s is one notable exception (Tsugitaka Sato, “Historical Character of
al-Rawk an-Nasiri in Mamluk Syria”, in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bilad al-Sham (Amman,
1984), 223-225.
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accounts of the management and planting cycles of Egyptian agricultural land by al-Makhzumi,
Ibn Mammati, al-Nabulsi, and al-Nuwayri, they conclude the following:
1. The muqﬂa‘ was responsible for digging canals, building dams, and maintaining both.
He relied on peasants for most of these activities but could use corvée labor and his own
soldiers when needed. By and large he did not reside on his iqﬂ®‘; he generally relied on his
own agents (wak¬ls) to estimate local taxes and collect them on his behalf 6 . Because the
iqﬂ®‘®t were fractured, one muqt®‘ could hire as many as four or five wak¬ls for these purposes 7 .
2. Muqﬂ®‘s rarely interfered in the internal operations of the planting and harvests. It
was the fall®Ω‚n themselves who decided what to plant, on what schedule to rotate crops, and
how to share water. In other words, local custom generally prevailed in matters of cropping,
harvest, and processing. One notable exception is sugar production, which was more closely
monitored by the muqt®‘, who in Jordan was often the sultan himself. On “sugar estates” the
cropping of the sugar plant took precedent over other crops and customary water sharing
agreements, interrupting crop rotation and the planting of summer crops 8 .
3. Taxes on grains (kharaj al-zir®‘ah) were generally paid in kind in Egypt 9 . The presence
of grain storage facilities throughout Jordan by the fourteenth century suggests that grain was
stored on site and at transport depots on main roads. Grain surplus could be used for times of
need, which was often exploited by the state through forced purchases (ﬂarΩ), or to provide
provisions for agricultural laborers who supplemented the labor on sugar estates 10 .
While Jordanian agriculture was broad-based and produced a variety of grains, fruits,
and vegetables for the region, the staple here, as in Egypt, was wheat. Wheat is a winter crop
that requires adequate rainfall during the growing season (200-300 centimeters per year in
Jordan) and dry storage 11. It is grown all over the country, but the largest fields are on the
open plains of central and southern Jordan (Fig. 1). Because Jordan’s wadis run with water
only seasonally and are not generally navigable, local farmers had no major river, like the
Nile, on which to rely for transport of grains to major storage facilities. Therefore, much
6. Sugar tax is one notable exception: muqﬂ®‘s, who were generally the sultans themselves, often personally supervised
the collection of tax on sugar.
7. Hassanein Rabie, The Financial System of Egypt: A.H. 564-741/A.D. 1169-1341 (London, 1972), 65.
8. Sato, State and Rural Society, 212, 233.
9. Rabie, Financial System of Egypt, 74-76.
10. Sato, State and Rural Society, 201.
11. This is one major way in which Jordanian agriculture traditionally differed from Egyptian agriculture. The
Jordan River, unlike the Nile once did, does not flood annually. With the exception of summer crops grown in the Ghor
and in wadi basins, most farming in Jordan was dependant on winter rainfall.
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transport from threshing floors to granaries (shuwan) must have been done overland, on the
extensive road system developed in the early Mamluk period. The granaries took two forms:
formally built shunas, which is a common enough place name in the Jordan Valley, and
reused cisterns, which are ubiquitous in the country’s soft limestone beds and can preserve
grains for up to two years 12 . Both facilities required regular maintenance through cleaning
and plastering. Because of Jordan’s special hydrological conditions and infrastructure, its
grain industry was highly vulnerable to drought and the security of the road system. As for
cropping patterns, the fall®Ω‚n of Jordan traditionally practiced a two-crop rotation on most
cultivated land, including the Jordan Valley. Land tenure, in those areas not assigned as iqﬂ®‘®t,
may have been communal, with a division of revenues among villagers after the harvest
according to shares, known today as musha‘ and very similar to the pattern of shares adopted
by the muqta‘s 13 .
12. J.M.H. Kareem, The Settlement Patterns in the Jordan Valley in the Mid- to Late Islamic Period (Oxford,
2000), 10; Carol Palmer, “‘Following the Plow’: the Agricultural Environment of Northern Jordan”, Levant 30 (1998):
155.
13. Communally-held land was the pattern in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and is also suggested by early
Ottoman tax registers. It remains to be documented with certainty that this was the traditional pattern in the Mamluk
period, however. See discussion below.
Fig. 1. Wheat fields in Hisban today. The well-watered Madaba Plains were one of the
bread-baskets of Mamluk-period Jordan and an important revenue base for the state.
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Given these factors, but in the unfortunate absence of written sources for verification,
one can cautiously propose that the rawk of 713/1313 impacted Jordanian agriculture in multiple
ways. To being with, the fragmentation of iqﬂ®‘®t may have produced a more complex system
of tax collection and transportation, particularly of grains, under the supervision of the agents
of multiple muqﬂ®‘s. It is not clear at this point whether there was any coordination of efforts
on the part of these agents or if tax revenues (in kind or in cash) were simply divided by the
muqﬂ®‘s shares of the revenues after the harvest or sale and conversion of crops to currency.
Regardless, the multiplication of muqﬂ®‘s likely meant heavier traffic on the road system and
made more vital than ever the security of these transportation corridors for the purposes of tax
collection.
On a second note, the concentration of iqﬂ®‘®t in the hands of the sultan led to the
development of large estates based on the production of specialized cash crops, such as sugar
cane and olive oil, for export markets. These “plantations’ transformed traditional cropping,
water sharing, and labor organization. The sugar plantations in the Jordan Valley and on the
tributaries of the Jordan River best illustrate these patterns. Cane sugar production requires a
soft, well-drained soil, high temperatures, extensive irrigation, and a large labor force 14 . In
addition to resident fall®Ω¬n, seasonal, migrant workers assisted in some of the heaviest labor
tasks associated with sugar processing, and there is some evidence for the use of slaves, as
well 15 . The soil requirements, the long period of cultivation (ten months), and the labor
intensive activities associated with pre-sowing land preparation and maintenance make it
impossible to grow other summer crops, namely vegetables that tend to bring in large revenues,
or to maintain the traditional two-crop rotation 16 . Moreover, growing sugar cane requires the
diversion of irrigation water from other crops 17 .
The concentration of land in the hands of a single muqﬂ®‘, as in the case of the sultanic
sugar estates, was certainly conducive to plantation-style production. What impact, however,
the fragmentation of what were largely grain-producing regions had on annual yields and tax
revenues in general has yet to be determined. The nineteenth-century grain boom of Palestine
and Transjordan, for example, would not have been possible without the development of
large landed estates after the implementation of the Ottomans’ 1858 Land Law. There was a
significant shift from subsistence farming and limited production for local markets to surplus
14. Sato, State and Rural Society, 216; Kareem, Settlement Patterns in the Jordan Valley, 13.
15. Sato, State and Rural Society, 185; Kareem, Settlement Patterns in the Jordan Valley, 11.
16. Sato, State and Rural Society, 217, 220.
17. Ibid., 212.
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production for export to Europe 18 . Ottoman tax registers, as well, indicate that large estates
brought in more tax revenue for the state, individually, than family or village-owned farms,
collectively. In the absence of a comparison of grain yields between the pre- and post-rawk
periods, it is not possible to determine what impact such patterns had on yield as a whole.
However they do suggest that that fragmented land was more expensive, in the end, to
administer for tax purposes.
On the economic level, all of these developments required more from the muqﬂ®‘s, in
terms of maintenance of irrigation canals and storage facilities, than before al-N®◊ir
MuΩammad’s survey, diverted Jordanian agriculture from a diversified to a specialized and
export regime, and was profit-driven. Such a transformation of the local regime was certainly
profitable, as the Ottoman defters demonstrate, however it required a strong state and demanded
safe transport and storage. Security was a particular concern for grain production, which was
concentrated on the open plains and was particularly susceptible to disruption during times of
political unrest. As the lynchpin of the Mamluk economy, problems in the grain sector had
serious ramifications for the state’s economy as a whole.
On the level of social relations, two preliminary observations can be made. First, after
713/1313 the state came to control more directly Jordanian land. In the case of “plantations”,
this meant that peasants would have been less autonomous in planting decisions and the
general management of land targeted by the state for export production. Traditional
arrangements for the sharing of water, crop rotation, and the organization of labor and
production for regional markets would have been overturned in favor of systems better suited
to a plantation economy. The Jordan Valley was particularly impacted in this way. The second
effect was to consolidate the economic and political hold of the largest iqﬂ®‘ holders – outside
of the sultan himself, this would have been provincial and district governors and high-ranking
amirs – over local peasants. It is no coincidence that the one of the most harmful economic
practices of the day, forced purchases (or ﬂarΩ), was most common in regions most associated
with amiral rebellions. The political turmoil of fifteenth-century Kerak should be analyzed in
this light. Nonetheless, in both cases Jordanian peasants resisted state control, when it was
damaging to local society and its economy, and asserted themselves in creative ways, as we
will see shortly.
18. Linda Schilcher, “The Grain Economy of Late Ottoman Syria and the Issue of Large-Scale Commercialization”,
in Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, eds. Çaglar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany, 1991),
173-195.
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Fig. 2. Sultanic Endowments and Administrative Centers in Mamluk Jordan.
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ENDOWMENTS (see Fig. 2)
The endowment of rural lands by the Mamluk elite, primarily for charitable purposes,
is yet another factor in state control of the provinces. The current debate in the U.S. and Egypt
on sultanic awq®f has focused on the large-scale endowment of Egyptian and Syrian land by
Mamluk sultans during the mid-late fifteenth century 19 .
Articles written by Carl Petry (University of Southern Illinois) in the late 1990s, which
examined the endowment strategies of Sultans Qaytbay and al-Ghawr¬, and the masterful
monograph on late Mamluk land tenure by ‘Im®d Badr al-D¬n Ab‚ Gh®z¬ (Cairo University),
which was published in 2000, have challenged traditional interpretations about the motivations
behind such endowments 20 . Focusing their analysis on Egyptian agricultural land, and the
sales documents and waqfiyyat in Cairo preserved from this period, they argue that there was
a phenomenon of endowment of Egyptian farmland by Mamluk sultans late in the period; that
this land was largely acquired through purchase of land previous registered as iqﬂ®‘®t, under
somewhat dubious legal circumstances, directly from the Bayt al-M®l; that much of this land
was acquired and endowed piecemeal (very little of it as entire villages); and that the rationale
for these endowments may have very little to do with raising money for military campaigns
(as contemporary sources claim) or for protecting assets from confiscation. Petry describes
these endowments as investments, in a very modern sense of the term - a central repository of
assets serving, in this limited sense, as a bank 21 . Citing the considerable difference between
the revenues gained from this land and the comparatively meager financial requirements of
the endowments (largely madrasas) they purportedly supported - a difference that, in some
cases, reached 90% - he suggests that the process of sultanic endowments of rural land was,
thus, profit-driven, rather than security-driven 22 .
19. A panel on “Decline or Transformation? The Economy of the Late Medieval Middle East”, part of the Annual
International Congress on Medieval Studies, held at 5-8 May 2005 at the University of Western Michigan in Kalamazoo,
Michigan, emphasized this theme.
20. Carl F. Petry, “Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Regime: The Holdings of al-Ashraf Qaytbay and Qansuh
al-Ghawri According to their Waqf Deeds”, Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 41.1 (1998): 96-
117 and idem, “Waqf as an Instrument of Investment in the Mamluk Sultanate: Security vs. Profit?”, in Slave Elites in
the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study, ed. Toru Miura and John Edward Philips (New York, 2000), 99-
115; ‘Imad Badr al-Din Abu Ghazi, Taﬂawwur al-ºiy®zah al-Zir®‘iyah fi Mi◊r Zaman al-Mam®l¬k al-Jar®kisah (Cairo,
2000); see also Carl F. Petry, Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning as a Great
Power (Albany, 1994), 196-210.
21. Petry, Protectors or Praetorians, 210.
22. Petry, “Waqf as an Instrument of Investment”, 104.
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As for Jordan, the same process occurred here, but there were some important differences.
The largest documented sultanic endowments date to the reign of Barq‚q, were acquired in the
same fashion as in Egypt (through purchase from the Bayt al-M®l, as is documented in the
original waqfiyyat, where available), and were concentrated in the Jordan Valley and the Saw®d
of the northern hill country (some of the richest farmland in the region). However, the earliest
recorded endowments consisted of entire villages, not merely shares 23 . The lands described are
located in the most fertile regions of Jordan and fall into three categories: grain fields of the
plains, sugar plantations of the Jordan Valley, and the orchards of the Saw®d (which produced
high quality olive oil, as they do today). Wheat, sugar, and olive oil - these were the staples of
the average man’s diet in this period, and were, thus, excellent commodities to control by
enterprising entrepreneurs 24 . These estates remained intact as taxable units, whether they were
retained as endowments or not, through the sixteenth century and subject to the ‘ushr tax (at
10%). Their revenues are recorded in the Ottoman defters. Their longevity alone suggests that
if the endowments were investment-motivated, they were sound strategies on the long-term.
23. The documented examples are few: two shares of the village Bayt Rama in the Jordan Valley, for Sultan
Baybars’ madrasa complex in Cairo, (no date given – ibid); the village of Adar near Kerak, in its entirety, for an
unnamed recipient, by Sultan Sha‘ban in 777/1375 (Y‚suf Ghaw®nmeh, T®r¬kh Sharq¬ al-Urdunn fi ‘Asr Dawlat al-
Mam®lik al-Ul® (al-Qism al-ºa¥ar¬) (Amman, 1979), 243-244; idem, “al-Qarya fi Jun‚b al-Sh®m (al-Urdunn wa-
Filistin) f¬ al-‘A◊r al-Maml‚k¬ fi Øaw’ Waqfiyy®t ‘Adar, Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan 1 (1982):
363-371; the Jordan Valley villages of Nimrin, Kafrin, and Zara‘a, in their entirety, for Sultan Barq‚q’s madrasa-
mausoleum complex in Cairo (no date given – MuΩammad Ipsharl¬ and MuΩammad al-Tam¬m¬, Awq®f wa Aml®k al-
Muslim¬n fi Filisﬂ¬n (Istanbul, 1982), 94; MuΩammad ‘Adn®n al-Bakh¬t and Noufan Raj® Hmoud, The Detailed Defter
of Liwa’ ‘Ajl‚n (The District of Ajl‚n) Tapu Defteri No. 185, Ankara 1005 A.H./1596 A.D. (Amman, 1991), 32); the
village of Malka in the Saw®d, in its entirety, for the same complex, in 796/1393 (Waqfiyah 9/51, D®r al-Wath®’iq,
Cairo, in Bethany J. Walker, “The Northern Jordan Survey 2003 – Agriculture in Late Islamic Malka and Hubras
Villages: A Preliminary Report of the First Season”, Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 339 (2005):
71; idem, “Regional Market and their Impact on Agriculture in Mamluk and Ottoman Transjordan”, in On the Fringe of
Society: Archaeological and Ethnographical Perspectives on Pastoral and Agricultural Societies, ed. Benjamin Saidel
and Eveline van der Steen  (Oxford, 2007): 117-125; and idem, “Mamluk Investment in the Transjordan: A ‘Boom and
Bust’ Economy”, Mamluk Studies Review 8.2 (2004): 130); three shares each of the Saw®d villages of Marw and
Harhar, for Sultan Kh‚shqadam’s madrasa complex in Cairo (no date given, MuΩammad ‘Adn®n al-Bakh¬t, N®Ωiyat
Ban¬ Kin®nah (Sham®l¬ al-Urdunn) fi al-‘A◊r al-‘§shir al-Hijri/al-S®dis ‘Ashar al-M¬l®d¬ (Amman, 1989), 38, 45); and
twelve shares of an unnamed mazra‘a (isolated farm) in the Jordan Valley for the same complex (no date given, al-
Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185, 32). In addition to these are unpublished references in contemporary waqfiyyat
to a village on the outskirts of Kerak (its name not preserved in the fragmentary manuscript – Waqfiyah #49, microfilm
#15m folia 1-4, D®r al-Wath®’iq, Cairo), for the same complex in Cairo, and other rural land in the vicinity of Kerak,
for Sultan Hasan’s monumental madrasa complex in Cairo (endowed in 762 A.H., Waqfiyah #40, microfilm #15, folia
1-3, D®r al-Wath®’iq, Cairo).
24. For estimates of the profits made on sugar, see the calculations from the storeroom at the citadel at Tall Hisban
in my “Sowing the Seeds of Rural Decline?: Agriculture as an Economic Barometer for Late Mamluk Jordan”, Mamluk
Studies Review 11.1 (2007): 190-191.
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It is worth examining the waqfiyyah for one of these sultanic endowments, the village
of Malka, in some detail as it is quite illuminating for the kind of rural properties that were the
focus of the financial activities of Mamluk sultans in Jordan in this period (Fig. 3). The
document records the endowment of several urban properties and rural estates in Egypt and
Greater Syria owned by the Mamluk sultan Barq‚q in 796 A.H./1393 A.D. The recipient of
the endowment of these properties is a madrasah (Islamic law school) that the sultan had
recently built in the heart of Cairo on the Bayn al-Qa◊rayn.
The paper scroll is handwritten in semi-voweled naskh¬ in a form of legal Arabic used
by the Egyptian chancery of this period and, from the facsimile copy available for study,
appears to be adequately preserved, with limited water and insect damage 25 .
Folia 18-21 of this 2.5 meter-long scroll describe the village of “Hay Malka” at the end
of the century and document in some detail the dimensions of the medieval village, the
25. The scroll was restored by the D®r al-Wath®’iq in Cairo in 2001.
26. Ghaw®nmeh, “al-Qarya f¬ Jan‚b al-Sh®m”.
countryside’s topography and water
sources, the village’s taxable agricultural
production, and a few of its noteworthy
monuments (including the village mosque)
and roads. The text also notes what fields,
buildings, and installations, such as presses
(ma‘®◊ir – presumably for olive oil) have
fallen into disuse. Neighboring villages are
named, such as ‘Ayn ‘Atiyya, as they
constitute the borders of the village estate.
According to the waqfiyyah the village
produced mostly olive oil and wine. The
preference for well-watered lands near
appropriate marketplaces and administrative
centers and serviced by roads is suggested
by the document and is paralleled by the
waqfiyyah of ‘Adar by Sulﬂ®n Sha‘b®n 26 .Fig. 3 – Olive groves in the village of Malka, near the
olive processing plant identified during survey in 2003.
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Physical remains of the olive oil industry described in this document were identified
during archaeological survey under my direction in 2003. It is possible to cautiously estimate
production of this single factory, by adopting the production calculations from sites in the
region exhibiting comparable technology and, in the absence of such records from the Mamluk
period, carefully considering the figures from early Ottoman tax registers (tapu defteri) 27 .
The press consisted of six shafts, the remains of press arms, cut into the wall interiors of a
natural cave (Cave 12) on the western edge of the village, used from the Byzantine through
Mamluk periods. The cave included, as well, two ceiling holes for screw-and-weight presses.
In addition, the remnants of a basalt grinding stone were left in the cave interior. According to
calculations made for similar weighted lever plants at the Hellenistic site of Maresha in the
Galilee, and assuming that all six presses were in use in this period and operating
simultaneously, six hectares of olive groves would have supported this single plant at Malka
and could have produced 13,000-27,000 liters of olive oil annually. Of this amount, over
10,000 liters were surplus, exceeding the needs of local consumption, and were thus available
for sale in local markets or export 28 .
As for the value of such surplus in fourteenth-century currency, I rely on the price
indices of Ashtor. Today a liter of olive oil weighs 9/10 of a kilogram; the 10,000 liters
surplus from this single plant at Malka would have weighed a total of 9000 kg, which was the
equivalent of 482 Syrian qinﬂ®rs 29 . Ashtor, citing Ibn Kath¬r, records an export price in the
27. It is entirely possible that other presses were in operation at the same time, elsewhere in the medieval village,
although they were not visible to us during the survey. The following calculations are only for the six presses we
identified in Cave 12.
28. Nahum Sagiv and Amos Kloner, “Maresha Underground Olive Oil Production in the Hellenistic Period”, in
Olive Oil in Antiquity: Israel and Neighbouring Countries from the Neolithic to the Early Arab Period, ed. D. Eitam
and M. Heltzer (Padova, 1996), 276-277. This is based on a conservative population estimate of 150 people, arrived at
by using figures from an Ottoman land register (Tapu Tahrir Defteri) of 1596-7. The census records 27 families (kh®ne)
and 15 bachelors (mufrad) (al-Bakhit, N®Ωiyat Ben¬ Kin®na, 22, Table I). A peasant family, for the purposes of Ottoman
tax registers, consisted of a nuclear family (mother, father, and children) (Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The
Classical Age 1300-1600 (London, 1994, reprint), 144). Our modest estimate is deliberately low at a five-member
household. (Such numbers should be used with caution, however. For criticisms of calculating population size on the
basis of Ottoman tax surveys, see Bekir Kemal Ataman, “Ottoman Demographic History (14th-17th Centuries): Some
Considerations”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 35 (1992): 187-198 and Heath W. Lowry,
“The Ottoman Tahrir Defterleri as a Source for Social and Economic History: Pitfalls and Limitations”, in Studies in
Defterology: Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, Ibid. (Istanbul 1992), 3-18.).
29. My estimates for modern weight and volume calculations were retrieved on-line at: www.olivebusiness.com/
oliveHanbook/GrowingOlives/olive_balance_sheet.htm.
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year 1347 of 4.5 dirhams per Damascus ratl of oil, which was 9 dinars per Syrian qinﬂ®r 30 . In
the mid-fourteenth century, then, this plant could have produced a profit of 440 dinars annually.
This is, of course, assuming the same end product, which was soap. If a higher quality product
was the result, such as table oil, it would have been worth considerably more. The profit
either way would not have been negligable: it would have represented, for example, over
30% of the cost of a shipment of 2790 jars of Spanish olive oil to Alexandria in 1405 31 .
Sultanic estates were, thus, lucrative, even on the level of the individual village.
Malka, in addition to the other sultanic estates cited above (see note 23), followed the
general pattern of growth (in terms of population and revenues) and agricultural diversification
that characterizes early Ottoman Jordan. The largest of the pre-Ottoman endowments were,
by and large, retained as large taxable units and taxed at 10%; those tax revenues then became
the kh®◊◊ of the Ottoman sultan or provincial governor. On the other hand, agricultural land
that was not endowed seems to have fragmented even further into smaller taxable units
(percentages of villages of isolated farms, mazra‘a, for example), cultivated and tax-paying
but, in many cases, no longer permanently settled. Much of central Jordan falls into this
category, including Hisban, the former capital of the Balqa, which was fully abandoned by
the end of the century and paying only a pastoral tax, presumably by semi-nomadic tribes that
camped there on a seasonal basis 32. The regional pattern of growth and decline that emerges
for late Mamluk and early Ottoman Jordan suggests, perhaps, that endowment, through waqf,
was the key to preserving the financial solvency of agricultural estates, particularly in times
of political turmoil.
ASSESSING RURAL DECLINE FOR LATE MAMLUK JORDAN: CONFLICTS BETWEEN
PEASANTS AND STATE
The fifteenth century was, indeed, a troubled period for the Mamluk state, one that is
punctuated by rebellions and economic decline. Al-Maqr¬z¬ was one of the most vocal critics
30. Eliyahu Ashtor, Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l’orient médiéval (Paris, 1969), 407.
31. Notarial records in the Vatican record a shipment of olive oil from Seville to Alexandria in 1405, when the
Mamluk state was now importing large quantities of oil from Europe; the shipment was worth 1400 dinars at the time
(Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), 214). While there is a fifty-year difference
between this shipment and the price estimate used above, and we are not certain from the data provided about the
quality of the oils and how they compare, the comparison in profits is, nonetheless, informative for the scale.
32. Al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185, 149; Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamal ‘Abdulfattah, Historical
Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century (Erlangen, 1977), 169.
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of fiscal practices, which he blamed for the state’s fiscal and military weakness. His Igh®that
al-ummah bi-kashf al-ghummah is a well structured critique of what he believed to be the
worst of these practices and describes the damage they have done to the Egyptian economy:
inflated prices and forced purchases (ﬂarΩ), bribery (particularly damaging when financial
offices are purchased in this manner), high taxes, and an unstable and inflated currency.
According to Maqr¬z¬, one natural factor lay behind such practices: drought, which ultimately
led to grain shortages 33.
The point of view of Syrian historians was comparable, in that they identified drought
as the single most important factor behind the financial and political decline of Bil®d al-Sh®m
and that regional political struggles flowed from it. Ibn Qadi Shuhba, who often commented
on agricultural conditions throughout Syria, discusses the problems of Jordanian agriculture
in his obituary of Iy®s al-Jarkash¬, who was the Supervisor of the Jordan Valley (Mushadd al-
Aghw®r) during Barq‚q’s reign and died in prison in 799/1396. Contemporaries condemned
Iy®s for the economic collapse of the Jordan Valley in this period by diverting shared water to
his own plantations, forcing sales of his own sugar at inflated prices (ﬂarΩ) on local residents,
and terrorizing peasants by cutting the hands off accused thieves 34. After receiving complaints
from local peasants and administrators alike for his abuses, Sultan Barq‚q had Iy®s arrested
and killed that year. Ibn Sasra records the events that followed: the former viceroy in Damascus
was named to replace Iyas as Mushadd al-Aghw®r. Once he took up his new post, he began
buying up wheat from the markets in the Jordan Valley at low prices, hoarding them, and
reselling at inflated ones during the height of a famine 35.
Throughout the events of this year, contemporaries recognized the sultan’s active role
in addressing rural grievances and responding to drought and famine. Maqr¬z¬, in his Igh®that
al-ummah, mentions the grain shortages of 796/1393-4, as illustrating a rare instance when
the government acted responsibly to avoid famine. For Maqr¬z¬, there was no famine that
year, in spite of drought and grain shortages, because Barq‚q invested so much money in
charitable endowments 36. This intriguing statement suggests that, in the eyes of contemporaries,
33. Adel Allouche, Mamluk Economics: A Study and Translation of al-Maqrizi’s Ighathah (Salt Lake City, 1994),
50-54.
34. Taq¬ al-D¬n Abu Bakr AΩmad Ibn Q®¥¬ Shuhba, T®r¬kh Ibn Q®¥¬ Shuhba, vol. I, ed. Adnan Darwish (Damascus,
1987), 630-631.
35. Ibn Sasra as recorded in ºujjah, al-T®r¬kh al-Siy®s¬, 81.
36. Allouche, Mamluk Economics, 53.
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the endowment of rural lands, even while creating vast private estates for the elite, resulted in
good things for the people. Moreover, it was a response to natural crises, such as drought,
grain shortages, and famine – all the result of rainfall of insufficient levels to support an
adequate grain harvest.
Jordanian agriculture is particularly susceptible to drought. Many regions of the country
receive just enough rainfall to support the cropping of grains without irrigation; even today,
the wheat crop fails one out of every five years from insufficient rainfall 37 . Historical,
palynological, sedimentological, and dendrochronological analyses have all indicated that
the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed several cycles of drought in the region
and a general trend towards desertification: higher temperatures, reduced rainfall, and
abandonment of once cultivated fields 38 . Such processes coincided with cycles of settlement
abatement (and in many cases whole-scale abandonment of villages), which are documented
by archaeological surveys. So, too, are the local soils vulnerable, particularly to mismanagement
of the land. Sugar cane must be planted on land that has been left fallow for at least four
years 39 . After two years’ of harvest, the land must once again be left fallow or crops other
than sugar should be planted. According to Ibn Mamm®t¬, land on which sugar was planted
was taxed at a lower rate after the first year, thus losing value over time 40 . Sugar cultivation
is, moreover, demanding in terms of the mineral resources, water, and fuel required for growing
and processing and could lead to deforestation 41 . As forested land gradually disappeared,
whether for fuel for industrial activities or to clear land for agriculture, soil cover eroded and
37. Palmer, “Following the Plow”, 132.
38. Alan Horowitz, “Preliminary Palynological Indications as to the Climate of Israel during the Last 6000 Years”,
Paleorient 2.2 (1974): 407-414; Yusuf Ghawanmeh, “al-ﬁ®‘‚n wa-al-Jaf®f wa-Atharuhuma ‘ala al-Bi’ah fi Jun‚b al-
Sh®m (al-Urdunn wa Filisﬂ¬n) f¬ al-‘A◊r al-Maml‚k¬”, Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan 2 (1985): 315-
322; Nicole Shehadeh, “The Climate of Jordan in the Past and Present”, Studies in the History and Archaeology of
Jordan 2 (1985): 25-28; W. van Zeist, “Past and Present Environments of the Jordan Valley”, Studies in the History and
Archaeology of Jordan 2 (1985): 199-204; Heim et al, “Near East Desertification”; Bernhard Lucke, Michael Schmidt,
Ziad al-Saad, Oliver Bens, and Reinhard Hüttl, “Abandonment of the Decapolis Region in Northern Jordan – Forced by
Environmental Change”, Quaternary International 135.1 (2004): 65-82.
39. Sato, State and Rural Society, 216.
40. Rabie, Financial System of Egypt, 75.
41. Effie Photos-Jones, Konstantinos D. Politis, Heather F. James, Alan J. Hall, Richard E. Jones, and Jerry Hamer,
“The Sugar Industry in the Southern Jordan Valley: An Interim Report on the Pilot Season of Excavations, Geophysical
and Geological Surveys at Tawahin as-Sukkar and Khirbat ash-Shaykh ‘Isa, in Ghawr as-Safi”, Annual of the Department
of Antiquities of Jordan 46 (2002): 591-614.
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what was left was depleted of its constituent mineral resources 42  Thus, a combination of
reduced rainfall and cash crop farming may have contributed, in the long term, to environmental
degradation and crop failures.
The abandonment of villages and fields also contributes to desertification 43 . While on
the long run climatic shifts may account for settlement abandonment, the immediate causes in
the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in Jordan, according to contemporary sources,
were the armed conflicts among amirs posted there and their poor (short-sighted) administration
of the lands under their supervision. These rebellions seem to have peaked during Faraj’s
reign and were worst in the region around Kerak 44 . These rebellions are analyzed in a
sophisticated manner in the recently published doctoral dissertation of Shawkat Ramadan
Hujjah. Hujjah cites the amiral rebellions of Kerak as one of the most important factors behind
the decline of the agricultural sector in Jordan in the late Mamluk period and the general
economic demise of the Mamluk state. The rebellions were worst during the sultanate of
Faraj and had the heaviest impact on the region of Kerak, which went through ten governors
in twelve years 45 . The people of Kerak got involved (by both choice and coercion) in the
struggle for power among potential governors and among governors and the sultan, creating
deep divisions in their communities and resulting in civil war and much loss of life and
property. In both the rebellions of 802/1399 and 806/1404, it was the people of Kerak Town
and surrounding villages that paid the price for the fall of one governor and rise of another:
their leaders were brutally killed, their crops taken from them, and their households
plundered 46 .
Peasants were no mere spectators to the troubling events of the period. They lobbied to
have corrupt officials removed; made adjustments in their planting strategies and marketing
to keep village farmland solvent; relocated, when necessary, for their safety and livelihood;
42. For earlier periods, see Bernhard Lucke, Ziad al-Saad, Michael Schmidt, Reinhard Bäumler, S.-O. Lorenz,
P. Udluft, K.-U. Heussner, and Bethany J. Walker, “Soils and Land Use in the Decapolis Region (Northern Jordan):
Implications for Landscape Development and the Impact of Climate Change”, Zeitschrift des deutschen Palaestina-
Vereins, under review.
43. Carlos Cordova, “Pollen samples from Malka, Jordan: preliminary report”, Unpublished report of 2004, Grand
Valley State University project files, n.d.; Lucke et al, “The Abandonment of the Decapolis Region”.
44. Hujjah, al-T®r¬kh al-Siy®s¬, 250 ff. Bethany J. Walker, “Review of al-T®r¬kh al-Siy®s¬ li-Minﬂaqat Sharq¬ al-
Urdunn min Jan‚b al-Sh®m f¬ ‘A◊r Dawlat al-Mam®l¬k al-Th®niyah by Shawkat R. Hujjah”, Mamluk Studies Review
8.2 (2004): 221-222.
45. Hujjah, al-T®r¬kh al-Siy®s¬, Table 2, p. 168-169.
46. Ibid., 115-116.
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and participated, as well, in the endowment of rural properties. As discussed earlier, intensive
lobbying by local peasants was key to the removal of Iy®s al-Jarkash¬ from his office in the
Jordan Valley and his subsequent arrest and execution. Likewise, the people of Kerak took up
arms and refused the new governor entry into the town, forcing the government to appoint
someone more acceptable to the residents in his place 47 .
As officials of the government, governors and muqﬂ®‘s were primarily concerned about
maximizing profits. Villagers, on the other hand, viewed land in a different light. Tradition,
stability, security, and long-term viability of agricultural land and markets were key factors in
the decisions peasants made about how to manage their land. As we have seen, planting
strategies, that is what to plant where and on what schedule, were largely left to peasant
themselves, except in the case of the large government estates, such as the sugar “plantations”
in the Jordan Valley. As state control over rural lands weakened in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, peasants returned to more traditional cropping, at a subsistence level of
production or one organized for local markets, such as the regional marketplaces at Malka,
Hubras, and Ajlun in the North
 
48 and the seasonal markets (asw®q mawsim¬yah) along the
hajj route at Ajlun, Zarqa, Salt, and Aqaba 49. The sixteenth-century Ottoman tax registers
indicate the extent to which planting had changed from the late Mamluk period. For example,
there are no tax entries for either mills or sugar (in any form) for Nimrin, Kafrin, and Zara‘a
in either 944/1538 or 1005/1586
 
50. These former “sugar plantations”, instead, now produced
wheat, barley, and “summer crops” (fruits and vegetables); and oxen, along with sheep and
goats, were taxed. This fits more closely the model of traditional Jordanian agriculture, with
its oxen-drawn scratch plows, grain base, and two-crop rotation 51 .
There is, moreover, some indication that with the collapse of the iqﬂ®‘ system that land
tenure proceeded in two directions: towards individual, private ownership (kh®◊◊ estates and
47. Ibid., 117, citing al-Maqr¬z¬’s Kit®b al-Sul‚k.
48. Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bilad al-Sham”, 250; idem, “Mamluk Investment in the Transjordan”,
130-131.
49. Y‚suf Ghaw®nmah, “al-Tij®rah al-Dawliyyah f¬ al-Urdunn f¬ al-‘A◊r al-Maml‚k¬”, Studies in the History and
Archaeology of Jordan 3 (1987): 323-330; Fay◊al ‘Abdall®h MuΩammad Ben¬ Ham®d, “al-Asw®q al-Sh®miyyah fi al-
‘Asr al-Maml‚k¬”, M.A. thesis, Yarmouk University, 1992; Sa‘¬d ‘Al¬ M‚s® Khal¬l, “al-Tij®rah al-D®khiliyyah f¬ Dawlat
al-Mam®l¬k al-Th®niyah (784-922 A.H./1382-1516 A.D.)”, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Jordan, 1992, 51-52; Hujjah,
al-T®r¬kh al-Siy®s¬, 252-257.
50. Al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185, 125-126, 242; al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 970, 102,
112.
51. Palmer, “Following the Plow”.
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mulk transformed into awq®f, for example) and towards communal ownership (mush®‘). The
written sources fully support a model of private ownership, which we will consider below.
Ethnographic data suggests the latter. Until the British Mandate land registration of the 1930s,
much of Jordan’s permanently settled land was communally owned by entire villages, who
divided the harvest on the basis of shares 52 . While there is no indication of this pattern in the
written record for the Mamluk period, there is for the Ottoman, where the tax registers record
family shares in common land 53 . The tax registers as a whole indicate that in the late Mamluk
and early Ottoman periods Jordanian peasants simply reverted to old patterns of cropping and
land tenure that existed before the changes in the iqﬂ®‘ system created by the cadastral surveys.
While the written sources are ambiguous, at best, about the proprietorship and usufruct
status of land in Jordan at the end of the Mamluk period, archaeological methods may be used
to differentiate “on the ground”, as it were, between individually owned and communally
owned land. In her recent ethnographic-historical study of traditional patterns of land use in
Jordan, Palmer suggests ways in which the two patterns of ownership and use change the land
and mark it physically, comparing them in terms of the organization of work and general use
of the land 54 . Communal ownership of land, through social pressure, forces villagers to work
hard and cooperate in issues of crop management and maintenance; land is seldom left
uncultivated; there are no labor shortages, and the work load and benefits are essentially
egalitarian. Nonetheless, tradition dictates the choice of crops grown and how they are rotated,
which slows agricultural and economic growth, as such decisions do not necessarily respond
to markets; there is little investment in land (few financial incentives to invest effort and
resources in terracing and irrigation); villages cannot grow because they are physically hemmed
in by communally-owned fields (the borders of which are dictated by tradition); and agricultural
production remains, for the most part, subsistence-based. While consolidating the community,
the mush®’ system tends to be, according to this model, less efficient and productive than
private ownership.
52. Martha Mundy, “Village, Lan dand Individual Title: Musha‘ and Ottoman Land Registration in the ‘Ajlun
District”, in Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, eds. Eugene L. Rogran and Tariq Tell
(London, 1994), 58-79; Palmer, “Following the Plow”, 129-130; Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late
Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (Cambridge, 1999), 84; Michael R. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in
Jordan (Leiden, 2000), 41.
53. Al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185 and idem, Tapu Defteri No. 970, throughout.
54. Carol Palmer, “Whose land is it anyway” An historical examination of land tenure and agriculture in northern
Jordan”, in The Prehistory of Food: Appetites for Change, ed. Chris Gosden and Jon Hather (London, 1999), 300-302.
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Private, or individually-held, land follows a different course, according to Palmer. The
benefits of this system are that the individual makes decisions about cropping and crop rotation
and can base these decisions on market and environmental factors; new crops (or an emphasis
on high-profit ones, such as olive trees and summer vegetables) are introduced as local
production is commercialized. Grazing land tends to be freed up for cultivation; there are
significant financial incentives for the individual to invest in the land (through terracing and
irrigation); there is flexibility in the location of fields vis-à-vis the village (and villages can
expand and contract accordingly); and farming is intensive. On the other hand, the system
tends towards absentee landownership (which can result in land not being cultivated for long
periods of time), indebtedness (through forced land sales), labor shortages, and the increase
of rented land (leading, in turn, to disinterested oversight and management). It appears, as
well, that the state becomes more involved with local agriculture, as more land is owned
privately, and that forests gradually come under state control; one could argue that private
ownership strengthens the hand of the state in taxation, if nothing else. In short, while private
ownership can be very profitable, it can also lead to abandonment of the land, when in the
hands of apathetic, distant land owners.
The physical expression of these systems could take many forms. However, the
communal system should typically be identified with large tracts of cropped, alternating with
tracts of fallow, land. Private ownership on the village level, on the other hand, may be
recognized by patchwork patterns of smaller fields and continuous cropping. Archaeologically
one could examine archival photos to discern field patterns as one way of differentiating
mush®’ from privately-held land, and theoretically these patterns could be identified during
archaeological surveys, if a village and its fields were subsequently abandoned. While such
models are only suggestive for venues of future research, they do indicate the variety of ways
in which villagers interacted with the state and with their land, given certain patterns of land
proprietorship and usufruct. Decisions about how to organize labor and who “owns” the land,
therefore, could not only transform the physical surface of the land, in themselves they may
also be seen as survival strategies by local farmers to weather the political turmoil of the time
by redefining their relationships with each other, agricultural markets, and officialdom.
The decision to stay on the land or to abandon a village and relocate was another way
that peasants responded to political and economic insecurity. Abandonment of villages, in
this case, was usually temporary, until the crisis had passed. The villagers of Adhri‘at, for
example, relocated to Ajlun during Timur’s invasion of the Galilee and northern Jordan and
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55. Ibn Q®¥¬ Shuhba, T®r¬kh, vol. 4 (1994), 181.
56. Hujjah, al-Tarikh al-Siyasi, 116, citing al-Maqr¬z¬’s Kit®b al-Sul‚k.
57. Hütteroth and Abdalfattah, Historical Geography, Appendix.
58. See Robin Brown, “Late Islamic Ceramic Production and Distribution in the Southern Levant: A Socio-Economic
and Political Interpretation”, Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1992 for a discussion of
archaeological evidence for the move to the highlands at the end of the Mamluk period.
59. Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bil®d al-Sh®m”, 245.
60. Al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185, 31.
61. ‘Abdull®h Ibr®h¬m, “Thal®thah Wath®’iq Fiqhiyyah”, Majallah Kulliya al-Adab (J®mi‘ah al-Q®hirah) 25.1 (1963):
95-105.
returned when his forces left 55 . Similarly, the residents of several villages in the Jordan
Valley were forced to leave their land in 802/1399, when the first of several conflicts in
Kerak spilled out into neighboring areas 56 . In other instances, it may have been a form of
resistance to the state. According to the field results of archaeological surveys, the Kerak
Plateau and Madaba Plains, for example, experienced marked depopulation during the fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries. This scenario is supported by the Ottoman tax registers, which
refer to many villages in these regions as kh®l¬ (or empty) by the end of the sixteenth century 57 .
Such villages, nonetheless, still pay taxes, either on flocks or small plots of land, which indicates
either a resumption of a semi-nomadic lifestyle or relocation to other villages for residence
but continued cropping of the land. In the case of the Kerak Plateau, it is possible that villagers
of the lowlands simply moved to the highlands, to avoid the political entanglements of Kerak
Town 58 . In the case of Hisban, there was a gradual emptying out of the village, after the
relocation of the district capital and garrison to Amman in 757/1356 59 . Both were, in one
form or another, responses to state power, which expressed itself, on the one hand, as a threat
to personal security and, on the other, as the provider of military and economic security.
The most important expression of the political and economic prerogatives of peasants
vis-à-vis the state, however, was in their endowment of rural property that had become their
personal property. This property is listed as mulk in the Ottoman registers and usually made
waqf, as early as the late Mamluk period, for a local mosque or shrine or as a family endowment.
Such properties include shares in shops, mills, presses, orchards, houses, or land 60 . One
documented example exists in waqfiyyah form in St. Catherine’s Monastery in the Sinai,
which was the recipient of an endowment of a house by one Gh®nim ibn Sal¬m ibn al-Y®s¬ al-
M®lik¬ al-Shawbak¬ in 882/1477 61 . There are also several entries in the Ottoman registers of
private land acquired in the late Mamluk period and later endowed, primarily properties located
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in Kerak District by local residents. For example, the waqf of ‘Al¬ al-Karak¬ al-Bar¬d¬ for al-
Ka’in mosque in Kerak was financially supported by shares of small plots of land (qiﬂa‘) in
the village of al-Duqayr, purchased in 832/1428 but endowed in 925/1519 62 . There are several
isolated references, as well, to privately-owned land (mulk), usually as shares. The pattern
that emerges is a growth in land purchase and eventual endowment for family or charitable
estates by civilians. This process begins in the late Mamluk period and continues through the
sixteenth century. While an analysis of Ottoman land policies is beyond the scope of this
study, this shift in land tenure is noteworthy for the opportunities that emerged for peasants
with the collapse of the Mamluk regime.
CONCLUSIONS
Today’s concern in Jordan with sustainable agriculture through water and soil harvesting,
land reclamation, and new markets highlights the symbiotic relationship between the state
and farmers. Likewise, in medieval Islam it was through the management of land that the
most complex political relationships and responses acquired their fullest expression. Rather
than read the Mamluk period in Jordan as one of merely agricultural exploitation and ruin,
perhaps we should define it as one where the state and fall®Ω‚n together used land as the basis
of power and accommodation.
62. Al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri No. 185, 335.
